

# Evaluating the EU Consortia Block Exemption Regulation for liner shipping

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Confetra, Rome, Italy



## Outline

- What is the EU Consortia Block Exemption Regulation (BER)?
- Which developments should the evaluation take into account?
- Implications for the BER?




# Our perspective



**The Impact of Alliances  
in Container Shipping**



Case-Specific Policy Analysis



**Container Shipping in Europe**  
Data for the Evaluation of the EU  
Consortia Block Exemption

## What is the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation?

- Exemption from EU competition law, specific for liner shipping, time-bound (five years)
  - In place since 1995; big revision in 2009
  - Allows for operational cooperation, but also joint negotiation, information exchange
  - Applies to consortia up till 30% market share
  - Only if: it results in transport efficiencies, benefits are transferred to consumers, it does not affect competition, no other alternatives
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## Evaluation of the BER


- BER expires in April 2020
  - What to do then? Continue, repeal or revise?
  - Does it still make sense to have a BER?
  - Evaluation process started mid-2018
  - Consultation September-December 2018
  - Stakeholder meeting ITF/OECD: February 2019
  - EC: “decision by second half 2019”
  - Criteria for evaluation: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, value added
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## **Developments to take into account**

1. Ship size
2. Concentration
3. Limited differentiation
4. Vertical integration
5. Oligopoly and monopsony




# 1. Ship size Asia-North Europe



Source: Sea Intelligence


## 2. Concentration (global carrier capacity)

Capacity market shares global carriers (1998-2018)



## 2. Concentration (ship capacity per trade lane)


Far East-Europe and Europe- North America (February 2019)



Source: Alphaliner


## 2. Concentration (alliances)

Share non-alliances in East-West trades (2012-2018)



### 3. Less differentiation

Alliances provide less choice and service differentiation




Scheduled transit time Shanghai to Rotterdam/Antwerp per carrier (2012-2018)

Source: Sea Intelligence

### 3. Differentiation: no better service quality


Idle containership fleet (TEU capacity, 2009-2019)



Source: Alphaliner


### 3. Differentiation: no better service quality

Share of countries that can be reached by German exporters with zero transhipment 2006-2016




### 3. Differentiation: no better service quality

Schedule reliability on European trade lanes (2012-2018)




### 3. Differentiation: no better service quality

Number of blanked sailings on Asia-Europe trade lanes (2012-2018)



## 4. Vertical integration (terminals)


Types of terminal operators in Europe (2007-2017)



Source: Drewry

## 4. Vertical integration (terminals)


Types of terminal operators in Europe (2017)



Source: Drewry


## 4. Vertical integration (feederling)

Share of common and dedicated operators in European regions



## 4. Vertical integration (tonnage providers)


Share of container fleet provided by tonnage providers



Source: Alphaliner

## 5. Oligopoly

Market shares on Asia-North Europe trade lane, per quarter (2012-2018)




## 5. Oligopoly: less choice

Distinct port pairs on Asia-North Europe services 2012-2018




## 5. Oligopoly: less choice

Weekly service frequency on Asia-Europe trade lanes 2012-2018




## 5. Monopsony (buying power)



Source: Sea Intelligence

## 5. Monopsony and the port system

Monopsony power of alliances, playing off ports against each other



Deviation from trend-line growth (million TEUs) (1987-2017)

# Implications for Block Exemption Regulation?

Fundamental question:

- A special regime for liner shipping still justified?
  - Many sectors have alliances, but not a special exemption from competition law
  - Tendency: get rid of sector specific exemptions
  - Individual exemptions can increase scrutiny
  - Doubtful that four criteria that need to be fulfilled are still valid.
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## Implications for Block Exemption Regulation?

Issues to be dealt with:

- Performance monitoring
- Consultation with stakeholders
- Withdrawal clause
- Joint negotiation

Also other policies would be needed.



## Implications for Block Exemption Regulation?

Improving legal certainty

- Clarify market share threshold
- Define market share in capacity terms rather than volume terms
- Market definitions that align to practice of shippers and ports
- Data on which alliances exist and are covered by the BER



# Thank you!

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